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FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-WILLFULNESS NEED BE ONLY
SUBJECTIVELY REASONABLE-DOES THE GOVERNMENT Now FACE AN
IMPOSSIBLE BURDEN OF PROOF? Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
604 (1991).
In 19871 John L. Cheek was indicted on three counts of attempted
tax evasion2 and six counts of willful failure to file a federal income tax
return.' Cheek failed to file federal income tax returns after 1979," and
by mid-1980 he claimed as many as sixty withholding allowances.5 Be-
tween 1981 and 1984, Cheek also claimed exemption from federal in-
come tax on his W-4 forms.'
I. United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir. 1989).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1989) provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax im-
posed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided
by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
3. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (Supp. 1991) provides:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by
this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep any
records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax,
make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times
required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both, together with the costs of prosecution. In the case of any person with respect to
whom there is a failure to pay any estimated tax, this section shall not apply to such
person with respect to such failure if there is no addition to tax under section 6654 or
6655 with respect to such failure. In the case of a willful violation of any provision of
section 60501, the first sentence of this section shall be applied by substituting -5
years" for "1 year."
4. United States v. Cheek, Ill S. Ct. 604, 606 (1991).
5. Id.
6. Id. Cheek's activities went further. In 1983 he unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a re-
fund for the taxes withheld by his employer during 1982. Id. While unsuccessful in obtaining a
refund, Cheek was charged with knowingly presenting a false and fraudulent claim to the United
States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287. Id. at 607 n.2. In addition, Cheek challenged various
income tax provisions in civil courts and appeared at two trials of criminal tax offenders between
1982 and 1986. Id. at 607. In the four civil cases, the courts informed Cheek that his arguments
were frivolous and historically rejected by the courts. Id. Cheek argued that he was not a taxpayer
within the meaning of the tax laws, that wages are not income, that income taxes are not author-
ized by the sixteenth amendment, and that the sixteenth amendment cannot be enforced. Id. A
court of appeals labelled as frivolous Cheek's 1985 lawsuit in which he sought a refund for taxes
withheld by his employer in 1983 and 1984. Id. at 607 n.3. The court reduced the district court's
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Cheek made two arguments at trial, claiming first a sincere belief
that enforcement of the tax laws is unconstitutional and second, that
his actions between 1980 and 1986 were legal.7 Specifically, in his sec-
ond argument, Cheek claimed that he did not act with the statutory
willfulness required by tax law.' After a lengthy deliberation, the jury
convicted Cheek on all counts. 9 On appeal, Cheek argued that the dis-
Rule II sanction against Cheek's attorney from $10,000 to $5,000 but imposed an extra $1,500
for bringing a frivolous appeal. Id.
Evidence was presented at Cheek's trial that in 1980 or 1981 Cheek received word from an
attorney that courts consistently labelled as frivolous any claim that wages are not income. Id. at
607. The attorney also made clear to Cheek that the fifth amendment right against self incrimina-
tion does not protect a taxpayer against failing to file a tax return. Id. at 607 n.4. Cheek's attor-
ney informed him that to successfully challenge the tax system, he should sue for a refund after a
withholding is made or risk criminal prosecution. Id. See Briggs v. United States, 214 F.2d 699
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 864 (1954) (defendant's contention that his income was not
taxable held insufficient to support a defense for failing to report it); United States v. Mundt, 666
F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981) (court found defendant willfully failed to file by submitting protest
returns with no information but with notations and attachments claiming defendant's constitu-
tional rights would be violated if he were forced to disclose the requested information).
7. Cheek, Ill S. Ct. at 607. Cheek's belief in the unconstitutionality of the tax laws ulti-
mately failed. Id. at 613. However, Cheek's argument that he sincerely believed in the legality of
his actions between 1980 and 1986 prevailed with the Court. Id. at 611. In support of both con-
tentions, Cheek explained that his beliefs regarding the constitutionality of the tax laws arose
from indoctrination he obtained from attending antitax seminars since 1978, as well as from his
own studied conclusions. Id. at 607. The district court described Cheek's beliefs to the jury. In-
cluded in this description were Cheek's interpretations of the Constitution, court opinions, and the
common law. Id. at 608 n.5. The court informed the jury that Cheek testified that based on these
beliefs he concluded he was not required to file income tax returns or pay taxes. Id. Moreover, he
believed he properly claimed exempt status on his W-4 forms and that he could validly claim
refunds for all withholdings of his income. Id. See D. McGOWAN, D. O'DAY & K. NORTH, CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL TAX FRAUD § 16.32 at 521-22 (1986) (hereinafter McGOWAN) (noting that even
if a defendant is shown to have been aware of his legal duties in years past, intervening circum-
stances between those years and the year of the alleged crime may tend to show the defendant did
not have knowledge of the legal duties which he is charged with knowingly violating).
8. Cheek, Ill S. Ct. at 607.
9. Id. at 608. The jury received instructions that to "prove 'willfulness' the Government
must prove the voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty." Id. at 607. The trial
court instructed that such a burden cannot be proved by showing mistake, ignorance, or negli-
gence. Id. at 607-08. Further instructions stated that willfulness is negated by an objectively rea-
sonable good faith misunderstanding of the law but not by mere disagreement with the law. Id. at
608. Additionally, the jury was instructed that the defendant was to be found not guilty if the jury
believed Cheek honestly and reasonably thought that he did not have to pay income taxes or file
tax returns. Id.
After hours of deliberation, the jury requested further clarification and the judge provided the
following supplemental instruction: " '[A] person's opinion that the tax laws violate his constitu-
tional rights does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law. Furthermore, a person's
collection system and disagreement with the government's tax collection policies does not consti-
tute a good faith misunderstanding of the law.' " Id. Still unable to reach a verdict, the jury
received a final instruction that read: " 'Ain honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense and
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trict court misapplied the law when it instructed the jury that only an
objectively reasonable misunderstanding of the law can negate the tax
statute's willfulness requirement. 10 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 because the
objectively reasonable standard for the negation of statutory willfulness
applied by the Seventh Circuit' 8 conflicted with the subjective standard
applied by several other circuits.1 ' The Court vacated the judgment of
the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case for futher proceedings. 15
The Court held that in order to negate statutory willfulness' a good
faith misunderstanding of the tax laws or a good faith belief that one is
acting lawfully does not have to be objectively reasonable.'" Cheek v.
United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
The old maxim that ignorance or mistake of the law is not a de-
fense to criminal prosecution terrorizes citizens into informing them-
selves of the law." Common-law commentators presumed everyone
does not negate willfulness [and] advice or research resulting in the conclusion that wages of a
privately employed person are not income or that the tax laws are unconstitutional is not objec-
tively reasonable and cannot serve as the basis for a good faith misunderstanding of the law de-
fense.'" Id.
10. Id. at 608.
I. Id.
12. Cheek v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1108 (1990).
13. See United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1987) (requiring that actual
ignorance of the laws be objectively reasonable); United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (requiring that a good faith misunderstanding of the tax
laws be objectively reasonable).
14. Cheek. III S. Ct. at 609. See United States v. Whiteside, 810 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir.
1987); United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188 (Ist Cir. 1985); United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d
262 (10th Cir. 1985).
15. Cheek, I ll S. Ct. at 613. The Court stated that Cheek's views regarding the constitu-
tionality of the tax statutes are "irrelevant to the issue of willfulness [and should] not be heard by
the jury .. " Id. However, evidence of Cheek's misunderstanding of the tax laws should be
presented to the jury. Id. at 611.
16. Id. at 611.
17. See Yochum, Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse Except for Tax Crimes, 27 DuQ. L
REV. 221 (1989). This maxim has long been a part of the American legal system. See, e.g.,
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 441 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); Lambert v. Califor-
nia, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878); Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
404, 411 (1833); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 182 (1820) (Livingston, J.,
dissenting); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 47-48 (1881). Compare Yochum, supra, at 226 (sug-
gests that ignorance or mistake should no longer be valid defenses for tax crimes since "even
aliens must know April 15 is our day of reckoning").
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knew the law since supposedly it is "definite and knowable."1 8 This pre-
sumption was applied repeatedly in interpreting criminal statutes be-
cause the object of criminal laws is to force citizens to conform their
conduct to uniform standards. 9
Despite the traditional application of the ignorance-of-the-law-is-
no-excuse maxim, Congress lessened the maxim's force in regard to
federal income tax crimes.2 0 Congress did so by including specific in-
tent to violate the law as an element of many federal tax crimes." Ac-
cordingly, ignorance of the law became a defense, and not merely an
affirmative defense, to criminal tax prosecutions.2 Currently, "willful-
ness"2 3 is a necessary element of each federal criminal tax offense,24
and for nearly sixty years courts have struggled to properly define the
term as used in the tax statutes. 5
In 1933 the Supreme Court in United States v. Murdock2' held
that willfulness, as used in the federal income tax statutes, requires
proof of an intentional, knowing, or voluntary act as well as proof of an
18. Cheek, I11 S. Ct. at 609.
19. See, e.g,. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119-24 (1974); United States v. Inter-
national Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); Yochum, supra note 17, at 221.
20. Yochum, supra note 17, at 223. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933)
(the maxim was weakened under the federal income tax laws due to the complexity of the area).
21. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 609. Willfulness is included as an element of every criminal tax
offense. E.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201-07 (1989 & Supp. 1991). In 1919 Congress first included willful-
ness in the tax statutes. Note, Criminal Liability for Willful Evasion of an Uncertain Tax, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1355 n.47 (1981). Congress included the specific intent element, commonly
referred to as willfulness, to avoid criminally punishing a person who in good faith misunderstands
the extent of his tax liability, his duty to file a return, or his duty to keep adequate records. United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933). In Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943), the
Court noted that by including willfulness as an element, Congress meant to separate the inten-
tional tax violators from those who mean well but become confused. Id. at 496.
22. D. McGOWAN, supra note 7, at 502. Specific intent crimes, such as those involving
willfulness, allow ignorance of the law as a defense to prosecution despite the old maxim that
ignorance of the law is no excuse. Id. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
23. Judge Learned Hand said of the word "willful" that "[i]t's a very dreadful word. ...
It's an awful word. It's one of the most troublesome words in a statute that I know. If I were to
have the index purged, 'willful' would lead all the rest in spite of its being at the end of the
alphabet." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(10) comment n.47 (1985).
24. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201-07 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
25. Cheek. I I l S. Ct. at 609. Since 1933 the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
struggled to conclusively define willfulness in the context of federal income tax statutes. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973);
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
26. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
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evil motive, evil intent, or bad faith.27 The Court based this require-
ment on the notion that "willfully" is used in criminal statutes to de-
note an act committed "with a bad purpose . . . , without justifiable
excuse . . . , stubbornly, obstinately, perversely . . . . without ground
for believing it is lawful . . . . or by careless disregard whether or not
one has the right so to act. . . .28
The Court in Murdock found that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury: "If you believe that the reasons stated by the de-
fendant in his refusal to answer questions were given in good faith and
based upon his actual belief, you should consider that in determining
whether or not his refusal to answer the questions was wilful."'29 By
denying the defendant the requested instruction, the trial court effec-
tively destroyed the defendant's right to submit to the jury his absence
of evil motive.30 The Court, therefore, affirmed its earlier reversal of
the defendant's conviction for willfully failing to supply information on
his tax return.
3 1
Ten years later in Spies v. United States,32 the Court reaffirmed
Murdock and held that willfulness requires a showing of an evil mo-
tive.as The Court adhered to the evil motive requirement because
American courts traditionally have not favored imprisonment for non-
payment of debt.3" Also, the Court concluded that the felony sections
of the tax code required a higher showing of willfulness than did the
misdemeanor sections, particularly since the felony sections were cre-
ated by Congress to enforce the tax system.35
27. Id.
28. Id. at 394-95 (citations omitted). This string of definitions has become known as the
"Murdock List" and, according to one commentator, is the basis for two divergent lines of author-
ity defining willfulness. Orlando, "Willfully" Under Section 7203 of The Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, 74 DICK. L. REV. 563, 576 (1969). See also infra notes 37 and 38.
29. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 393.
30. Id. at 396. The Court noted that the defendant's refusal to answer the questions on his
tax return might have been intentional and lacking in legal justification. Id. at 397. However, the
Court added that a jury might still find that the defendant was not acting in bad faith or with evil
intent. Id. at 398.
31. Id. at 398. The defendant contended that he feared prosecution under state law if he
revealed certain information on his tax return. Id. at 393.
32. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
33. Id. at 498.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 497. The Court based this distinction on the grounds that the felony sections
required a showing of affirmative action whereas the misdemeanor sections required only a show-
ing of an omission. Id. at 499. See also Orlando, supra note 28, at 571. Congress must have
meant that felonies require a willful "commission in addition to the willful omissions" that consti-
1991]
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After Murdock and Spies, interpreting the exact meaning of stat-
utory willfulness presented problems." Courts faced defendants eager
to suggest that only a finding of "bad purpose" could bring their ac-
tions to the requisite level of willfulness required under the criminal tax
statutes.37 The government argued that a showing of one alternative
definition of willfulness contained in the Murdock List, such as careless
disregard, would suffice to support a showing of statutory willfulness.38
Confusion and a split of authority resulted over the interpretation
of Spies. 9 Courts did not uniformily apply the misdemeanor-felony dis-
tinction created by that decision.4 ' The standard adopted by each court
greatly influenced the defendant's likelihood of conviction or acquit-
tal."' The Spies and Murdock decisions were open to interpretation and
courts could arrive at any equitable decision they sought to reach."
tute misdemeanors. Orlando, supra note 28, at 571. This distinction was later abandoned. United
States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
36. Orlando, supra note 28, at 576.
37. Orlando, supra note 28, at 576. This was the strictest interpretation of Murdock and
greatly benefited the defendant since a jury instruction describing willfulness as anything other
than an act done with bad purpose was enough to constitute reversible error. For example, if the
court defined willfulness as an act done "without ground for believing it is lawful," the defendant
was entitled to a reversal of his conviction. This strict line of authority restrained the courts from
using any definition in the Murdock List other than the one describing willfulness as an act done
with a bad purpose. The premise of this construction was that any other charges to a jury "di-
lute[d] the stringent standards for bad purpose and evil motive" which the Supreme Court empha-
sized as necessary to show willfulness in Murdock. Orlando, supra note 28, at 576. See United
States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966).
38. Orlando, supra note 28, at 577. This was the weaker approach to the Murdock List
which supported dilution of the requisite showing of evil intent or bad purpose. Orlando, supra
note 28, at 577. See also Lumetta v. United States, 362 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1966); Martin v.
United States, 317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963); Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir.
1958), 278 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 832 (1960).
39. Orlando, supra note 28, at 577. See, e.g.. Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292 (9th
Cir. 1958) (lesser meaning for willfulness is required under the misdemeanor section than under
the felony section); United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966) (same evil motive is
required for both the felony and misdemeanor sections).
40. Orlando, supra note 28, at 577. If the lesser showing of willfulness standard was ap-
plied, defendants charged with misdemeanors were more likely to be convicted since the govern-
ment did not carry the burden of proving bad purpose or evil motive. Orlando, supra note 28, at
577. See, e.g., Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1958). If the stronger showing
of willfulness was required, it became more difficult for a defendant to be convicted of a tax
misdemeanor because the government would have to prove bad purpose or evil motive. Orlando,
supra note 28, at 577. See Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966); Haner v. United States, 315
F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963).
41. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
42. Orlando, supra note 28, at 589 n.122.
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In United States v. Bishop'3 the Court finally stated that the same
willfulness standard must be applied to both misdemeanor and felony
tax crimes." Willfulness at this point, connoted a voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty and involved a bad purpose or evil mo-
tive."5 Bishop rendered useless the alternative meanings of willfulness
outlined in Murdock." After Bishop all that remained of the Murdock
List was the requirement of "bad purpose or evil motive" for
willfulness.47
Unfortunately, much confusion resulted from the Court's state-
ment in Bishop that it would continue to use this definition with spe-
cific reference to the Murdock standard of "bad purpose or evil mo-
tive"' 8 until Congress provided otherwise.' 9 Although Bishop clearly
defined willfulness for misdemeanors and felonies, it failed to state
whether proof of motive was necessary to establish willfulness.5 0
In Bishop and Murdock the Court failed to indicate whether evil
motive or bad purpose connotes an immediate intent or an ultimate
goal.51 This distinction is relevant where a taxpayer does not pay taxes
based on a disagreement with the way in which the government spends
tax revenue.52 Such action is clearly a flagrant attempt to withhold
43. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
44. Id. at 361.
45. Id. at 360.
46. See 15 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 55A.19, at 76-77 (Dec. 1990)
[hereinafter MERTENS]. Prior to Bishop, the Murdock List was still useful to distinguish the stan-
dard of willfulness in felony and misdemeanor cases. Id. For example, willfully under a misde-
meanor statute meant to act with a bad purpose, without basis for believing one's action is lawful,
without reasonable cause, with caprice, or with careless disregard. Id. at 76 (citing Abdul v.
United States, 254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1958)). Compare supra note 28 and accompanying text.
However, in a felony statute willful meant to act with intent, knowledge, and purpose as it now
means in all tax crimes. MERTENS, supra, at 76.
47. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 361.
48. Id. Murdock rejected the contention that willfulness could be established by an inten-
tional violation of a tax misdemeanor statute without a showing of evil motive. Note, Meaning of
Willfulness for Tax Felonies and Misdemeanors, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 233 (1974).
49. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 361.
50. McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.04 at 496. Although it appeared the Court had conclu-
sively defined statutory willfulness, the use of ambiguous formulations, such as evil intent and evil
motive, made the definition less concise. McGOWAN, supra note 7, at 495-96. The confusion over
bad purpose, evil motive, and evil intent is due mainly to the fact that in Bishop the Court fol-
lowed the Murdock definition of these terms without recognizing that Murdock itself created the
ambiguous interpretation of willfulness. Note, supra note 48, at 238.
51. Note, supra note 48, at 234. Interestingly, in Bishop the Court defined bad purpose or
evil motive only in reference to Murdock. Note, supra note 48, at 233.
52. Note, supra note 48, at 234.
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from the government money which the taxpayer knows he owes."
Thus, the taxpayer intends to violate a legal duty although his ultimate
goal or motive is not evil.5 By defining willfulness as a "voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty" coupled with a showing of
"bad purpose or evil motive," the Court in Bishop made the standard
virtually impossible to prove.55
Despite all the confusion over the Bishop formulation of willful-
ness, it was clear that a minimum level of scienter equivalent to knowl-
edge was required to establish willfulness. 50 Carelessness and gross neg-
ligence no longer sufficed to support a finding of willfulness.57 The
Bishop requirement of bad purpose or evil motive presented another
problem. 58 It became necessary for courts to develop standards to sepa-
rate good purposes from evil motives.5
In 1976 the Court in United States v. Pomponioa0 settled much of
the confusion created by Bishop. The Court held that proof of motive"'
is not required to prove willfulness."' The Court concluded that willful-
ness "simply means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty.""3 The Court stated that Bishop did not hold that willfulness re-
53. Note, supra note 48, at 234.
54. Note, supra note 48, at 234.
55. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 360-61. See Note, supra note 48, at 234 (A taxpayer failing to pay
taxes based on an objection to the government's use of the money would not be convicted because
the government would be unable to establish the evil motive required in conjunction with the
intent to violate a known legal duty).
It has been argued that the evil motive requirement applied to the tax statutes was only
surplusage. Note, supra note 48, at 234. The evil motive requirement provided no additional pro-
tection to good faith taxpayers, yet it "hamstrung" the government by forcing it to establish the
defendant's motives as an element of the tax crime. Note, supra note 48, at 234. Thus, the Court's
desire to protect from conviction honest taxpayers who are easily confused was not furthered by
this requirement of bad faith or evil motive. Note, supra note 48, at 234. After Spies, the defini-
tion of willfulness did nothing but "encourage ignorance and charlantry." Yochum, supra note 17,
at 227.
56. Note, supra note 48, at 235.
57. Note, supra note 48, at 235.
58. Note, supra note 48, at 235.
59. Note, supra note 48, at 235. Courts had to decide whether failing to pay taxes in order
to buy medicine for a sick child was a good purpose and whether failing to pay taxes due to a bad
season at the horse races was a bad purpose. Note, supra note 48, at 235.
60. 429 U.S. 10 (1976).
61. Motive in this context means establishing the taxpayer's bad faith, evil intent, evil mo-
tive or lack of justification for his actions. McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.04 at 495.
62. Pomponio, 429 U.S. at 11-12.
63. Id. at 12. See United States v. Pohlman, 522 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); United States v. Greenlee, 517 F.2d 899 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 985 (1975); United States v. McCorkle, 511 F.2d 482 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
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quires proof of bad purpose or evil motive in addition to a violation of a
known legal duty.64 Thus, in Pomponio the Court put to rest the de-
fense's argument that proof of knowledge plus some other evil motive
was required to prove willfulness. 6 The Court affirmed the holding in
Bishop that willfully means the same thing in both the felony and mis-
demeanor tax statutes. 66
Despite the clear definition of statutory willfulness set forth in
Pomponio, courts occasionally deviated from this formulation.6" For ex-
ample, in United States v. Loney" the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
improperly characterized willfulness as acting with the specific intent
to do something forbidden by the law.69 Such imprecise statements
blurred the clear definition of willfulness set forth in Pomponio.7 ° The
"[i]ntent to do 'something wrong'" is not equivalent to the Court's
construction of willfulness as a voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty."' By requiring proof that the defendant did some-
thing illegal, such instructions fail to take notice of the situation where
a defendant intentionally commits an illegal act without knowing the
act is illegal.7 2
There are two defenses to statutory willfulness. First, a defendant
can plead ignorance of the tax laws. 73 The ignorance defense arose, at
423 U.S. 826 (1975); United States v. Hawk, 497 F.2d 365 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838
(1974).
64. 429 U.S. at 12. The Court pointed to the following language from Bishop to support its
contention that it never required a showing of bad faith or evil motive to establish willfulness:
The Court, in fact, has recognized that the word 'willfully' in these statutes gener-
ally connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. It has formulated
the requirement of willfulness as 'bad faith or evil intent,' . . . or 'evil motive and want
of justification in view of all the financial circumstances of the taxpayer,' . . or knowl-
edge that the taxpayer 'should have reported more income than he did. ....
412 U.S. at 360 (citations omitted). In hindsight, the Court concluded that its references in the
above language to other formulations of willfulness did not modify the original formulation of a
"voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." Pomponio, 429 U.S. at 12.
65. Yochum, supra note 17, at 225 n.19. The Court's "sheepish" opinion finally laid this
controversy to rest.
66. Pomponio, 429 U.S. at 12.
67. McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.06 at 497.
68. 719 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1983).
69. Id. at 1436.
70. McGOWAN. supra note 7, § 16.06 at 499.
71. McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.06 at 499.
72. McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.06 at 499. The best way to avoid jury confusion as to the
meaning of willfulness is to follow the Supreme Court's language precisely and instruct the jury
that willfulness requires that the defendant knew of his legal duty and that he intentionally vio-
lated that known legal duty. McGOWAN. supra note 7, § 16.06 at 500.
73. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933); Note, supra note 21, at 1356. It
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least in part, from the inclusion of the word "willfully" in the criminal
tax statutes.7' This defense seldom saves the defendant from conviction
because juries rarely believe it. 5 Presently, one cannot act willfully to
violate a tax statuate if one is ignorant of his duty to follow the stat-
ute.7 6 Secondly, a defendant can raise as a defense a misunderstand-
ing77 of the tax law or good faith belief that he violated no provision of
the tax law.78
In criminal tax cases, defenses of ignorance or misunderstanding
of a legal duty are distinguished from defenses that admit violation of a
statute.79 For example, a taxpayer might admit the elements of an of-
fense but gain an acquittal because of excuse or justification. 80 On the
other hand, the ignorance or misunderstanding defense negates the
willfulness element of the government's case.8
The Seventh Circuit confused the misunderstanding defense by la-
belling a sincere misunderstanding of a legal duty the "good faith de-
fense."82 By designating the defense as such, the Seventh Circuit
has been argued that ignorance should not be allowed as a defense since most people are aware of
the old maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse and still believe it to be true. Thus, only the
deceitful and tricky will utilize the ignorance defense. Yochum, supra note 17, at 227.
74. Yochum, supra note 17, at 233.
75. Note, supra note 21, at 1357 n.60. Moreover, if the circumstances of a case reveal that
the defendant's ignorance was due to purposely avoiding learning of a legal duty, the claim of
ignorance will usually fail. Note, supra note 21, at 1357 (citing United States v. Callahan, 588
F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1979)).
76. Infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. But cf. Yochum, supra note 17, at 233 (A
taxpayer who mistakenly concludes an item is a gift, and therefore is nontaxable, should not be
prosecuted; but a taxpayer who ignorantly concludes the item is not taxable should be subject to
criminal prosecution. In the first situation the taxpayer considered the law but rejected it, and in
the second, the law was ignored.).
77. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 396. It is important to note that a good faith misunderstanding of
the tax law, which is a valid defense to prosecution based on lack of statutory willfulness, is not
equivalent to a good faith disagreement with the tax law. For example, if a tax protester knows
that for thirty years courts have held that wages are taxable income, then the tax protester cannot
argue that he did not act willfully in refusing to pay taxes on this income. McGOWAN, supra note
7, § 16.06 at 498. This follows from the Supreme Court's definition of willfulness as a "voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty." Pomponio. 429 U.S. at 12. Also, a defendant cannot
raise as a valid defense the fact that he objects to the way in which income tax revenue is spent by
the federal government. MERTENS, supra note 46, § 55.A19 at 77.
78. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. Related to the misunderstanding and
good faith defenses, a court will not convict a taxpayer for violating a provision of the tax code
that was novel, vague, or unsettled at the time of the taxpayer's alleged violation. E.g., United
States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
79. McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.11 at 505.
80. McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.11 at 505. An example of this is the insanity defense.
81. McGOWAN. supra note 7, § 16.11 at 505.
82. See United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 450 U.S. 916
(1981).
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phrased the issue as pertaining to good faith rather than to willful-
ness.83 By shifting focus from the element of willfulness to the good
faith defense, the Seventh Circuit created a line of cases holding that a
good faith misunderstanding of the law must be objectively reasonable
in order to negate willfulness.8
Two standards emerged for determining whether a defendant's de-
fense to a criminal tax prosecution negates statutory willfulness.8 5 One
standard maintains that a good faith misunderstanding or ignorance of
the tax laws must be objectively reasonable to negate willfulness.88 The
other standard maintains that a misunderstanding or ignorance of the
tax laws must be only subjectively reasonable to negate statutory
willfulness. 87
Several circuits followed the subjective standard for negating will-
fulness. 88 In fact, the courts applying this standard were in accord with
the "overwhelming weight of authority."8 9 According to this line of
reasoning, a defendant's belief regarding the legality of his actions is
irrelevant to the issue of willfulness.90 This view recognized that the
83. McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.11 at 505.
84. See infra note 86.
85. See McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.11 at 505-06. See also United States v. Moore, 627
F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (good faith misunderstanding of the
tax laws must be objectively reasonable to negate willfulness); United States v. Whiteside, 810
F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1987) (good faith misunderstanding or ignorance of the tax laws need not be
objectively reasonable to negate willfulness).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
916 (1981); United States v. Bressler, 772 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082
(1986); United States v. Witvoet, 767 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Buckner, 830
F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1987). But see United States v. Dack, 747 F.2d 1172 (7th Cir. 1984) (defend-
ant could be acquitted if he could show a bona fide belief, even if it was objectively unreasonable).
87. See, e.g.. United States v. Whiteside, 810 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Phillips, 775 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188 (Ist Cir. 1985);
Battjes v. United States, 172 F.2d I (6th Cir. 1949). The term "subjectively reasonable" in this
context means that the taxpayer acted in good faith or with the actual belief that his actions were
correct.
88. See supra note 87.
89. McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.11 at 505. The better view was that a genuine, subjec-
tive misunderstanding of the law negated willfulness regardless of the reasonableness of the mis-
understanding. McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.11 at 506. This idea was based on the notion that a
jury will disregard a frivolous argument. See Yochum, supra 17, at 229.
90. Note, supra note 21, at 1356; McGOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.11 at 506. At most, the
objective reasonableness of a defendant's beliefs might be probative, but not dispositive. For exam-
ple, if a low-tax-bracket taxpayer who owes no tax does not file a return because he sincerely
believes he is not required to do so, then he has not acted willfully. McGOWAN, supra note 7, §
16.11 at 506.
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focus in criminal tax prosecutions should be on whether the taxpayer's
belief was actual and not whether the belief was reasonable.91 In areas
outside taxation, courts have tended to recognize the need to protect a
person who has a sincere but unreasonable belief from conviction or
liability.92
The Seventh Circuit appears to be the only circuit that required a
criminal prosecution defense to be objectively reasonable under the tax
statutes.93 The circuit's requirement of an objectively reasonable mis-
understanding or ignorance of the law was inconsistent with the bulk of
authority that interpreted willfulness according to the subjective
standard.94
Willfulness, along with the other elements95 of the criminal tax
91. See Yochum, supra note 17, at 230. In United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275 (10th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037 (1987), a tax protester decided, based on his own research,
that wages were not income. The court held that the tax protester could not enter his research into
evidence since all that was relevant to the case was whether he held the belief and not whether his
belief was reasonable. Id. at 1285.
Similarly, in United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188 (lst Cir. 1985), a taxpayer filed no return
and filed false W-4'9 on the basis that he owed no taxes. The taxpayer did not believe an exchange
of his time for money created income. The First Circuit vacated his conviction, holding that while
the outrageousness of a belief might certainly influence a jury's decision as to whether the defend-
ant actually held the belief, the taxpayer is innocent if the jury believes his alleged belief. Id. at
191-92. See Yochum, supra note 17, at 228.
92. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 502 Pa. 433, 442, 466 A.2d 1328, 1332 (1983)
(murder is reduced to manslaughter when the defendant raises the defense that her "belief, sin-
cere though unreasonable, negates malice"); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990)
(no willful discrimination where a belief is incorrect and even unreasonable if it is sincere); see
also Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119, 1140
(1990) (suggesting an alteration in the self-defense doctrine for battered wives who shoot their
husbands thinking sincerely, but unreasonably, that such an action is all they can do to protect
themselves); Note, The Sham Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: A Commercial
Speech Interpretation, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 573, 574 (1983) (a lobbyist should be able to freely
lobby without antitrust problems lurking in his mird so long as the lobbyist's belief that he will
achieve the hoped-for legislation is sincere even if unreasonable); PROSSER & KEETON. PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 107 at 742 (5th ed. 1984) (action for deceit cannot be sustained when a
speaker had an "honest belief, however unreasonable" that what he said was true and he had
information to justify the representation).
93. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
94. McGOWAN. supra note 7, § 16.11 at 505, § 16.04 at 496.
95. For example, to prove that a taxpayer attempted to defeat or evade a tax under the
felony provision of the Internal Revenue Code the government must prove the following: (1) an
additional tax due and owing; (2) willfulness; and (3) an attempt to evade or defeat a tax. Mc-
GOWAN, supra note 7, § 16.43 at 531. "Attempt" has been defined as the commission of some act,
as distinguished from the omission of some act. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943);
Northern, Protecting the Client in Criminal Tax Investigations, II WASHBURN L.J. 10, 12
(1972).
To prove violation of the misdemeanor provision for the willful failure to file a timely return,
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statutes, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 96 Usually, willful-
ness is the most difficult element for the government to prove in crimi-
nal tax prosecutions. 97 To prove willfulness, the government does not
have to present direct proof of willful intent. 8 Rather, the government
can imply willful intent from the defendant's acts.99 Consequently, the
government seldom prosecutes a taxpayer unless the taxpayer has a
pattern of behavior from which a jury might infer willfulness. 100
The government cannot successfully carry its burden of proof by
the taxpayer's failure to produce evidence which contradicts the gov-
ernment's allegations. 10 1 A defendant is better off if he attempts to
show that the government has not or cannot sustain its burden of
proof.102 This entails raising the defenses of ignorance or misunder-
standing of the pertinent tax law.' 03
In Cheek v. United States'0 " the Court noted that Cheek could be
convicted for evasion' 05 and failure to file' only if the government
proved Cheek acted willfully. 0 7 The case focused on the appropriate
interpretation of willfully as used in the statutes. 08 The Court con-
cluded, based on the reasoning in Bishop and Pomponio, that the gov-
ernment must establish that the law imposed a duty on the defendant,
that the defendant knew this duty existed, and that he voluntarily and
intentionally violated that duty.'09
the government must prove the following: (I) the defendant was a person required by law to file a
return; (2) that no return was filed; and (3) that the failure to file was willful. McGOWAN. supra
note 7, § 7203.
96. Comment, Administration of Criminal Tax Justice: Reading the Process, 32 Loy. L.
REV. 921, 925 (1987).
97. Northern, supra note 95, at 13.
98. MERTENS, supra note 46, § 55A.19 at 79-80 n.3.
99. MERTENS, supra note 46, § 55A.19 at 79w80 n.3.
100. Comment, supra note 96, at 926. The government follows this method most often when
it must rely on circumstantial or indirect evidence to establish its burden of proof. Comment,
supra note 96, at 926.
101. Comment, supra note 96, at 923.
102. Baiter, Fraud and Negligence, 32 J. TAX'N 46, 49 (1970).
103. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. Other methods useful for defeating the
government's assertion of willfulness include developing exculpatory evidence tending to show ei-
ther reliance on professional counsel or confusion due to an unsettled, or perhaps novel tax law.
Comment, supra note 96, at 925.
104. 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991) (Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority).
105. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1989). See supra note 2.
106. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1991). See supra note 3.
107. III S. Ct. at 607.
108. Id. See supra notes 2 and 3.
109. 111 S. Ct. at 610.
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At issue in Cheek was whether Cheek's belief that he was not vio-
lating a legal duty had to be objectively reasonable to prevent convic-
tion. °10 Cheek claimed that he did not know his legal duties because he
misunderstood the law."' Accordingly, he believed in good faith that
he was not violating any law. 11 2 Thus, the Court required the govern-
ment to negate Cheek's claim of misunderstanding in order to satisfy
the knowledge element required for statutory willfulness. " 3
Ultimately, the government must prove that the defendant knew
his legal duty.1 1 4 The Court reasoned that a person cannot know a legal
duty if that person is ignorant of it, misunderstands it, or believes it
does not exist." 5 The jury, therefore, must decide whether the defend-
ant in good faith misunderstood that legal duty." 6 The Court stated
that the reasonableness of the misunderstanding is irrelevant." 7 The
Court said that if Cheek truly believed that wages were not income,
then no matter how unreasonable a court finds the belief, the govern-
ment would fail in carrying its burden of proving willfulness." 8 In de-
termining whether or not to believe Cheek's claim of good faith belief
or misunderstanding, the jury may consider any source of admissible
evidence tending to show Cheek's awareness of his duty to file a return
treating wages as income. " 9
Cheek conceded that a defendant who knew the law, but disagreed
with it, cannot claim misunderstanding as a defense."0 He argued,
however, that a defendant who sincerely misunderstood the law could
not have known his legal duty and thus could not have acted will-
fully. '2 The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals."' The Supreme Court held that a defendant's good
110. Id.
111. Id. at 611 n.8.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 610.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 611.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. Such evidence includes the defendant's awareness of the following: (1) relevant
provisions of the Code or regulations; (2) court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax
law; (3) authoritative rulings of the Internal Revenue Service; and (4) any contents of the per-
sonal income tax return forms and accompanying instructions that make it plain that wages
should be designated as income. Id.
120. Id. at 611 n.8.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 611.
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faith belief defense need not be objectively reasonable.1"3
The defendant's knowledge and beliefs are traditionally considera-
tions for the jury.12' Requiring an objectively reasonable misunder-
standing involved a legal inquiry which the jury is not allowed to con-
sider."' People commonly have irrational beliefs. " Constitutional
questions under the sixth amendment's jury trial provisions arise if a
jury is not allowed to hear all relevant evidence regarding the defend-
ant's knowledge and beliefs of his statutory duties. 127 Where possible,
the Supreme Court interprets Congressional legislation in a way that
avoids constitutional questions. 2 8 The Court followed the foregoing
tradition in order to avoid the constitutional issues.129
The Court found the district court erred in instructing the jury to
disregard evidence of Cheek's belief that the Internal Revenue Code
does not tax wages or require a taxpayer such as Cheek to file a tax
return.3 0 The admissibility of Cheek's beliefs is not dependent on their
reasonableness.'' However, the more unreasonable his beliefs, the less
likely it is that the jury will believe that he held them.' 32
The Court rejected Cheek's argument that his beliefs' 33 concern-
ing the constitutional validity of the tax laws should have been heard
by the jury.' 3 ' This decision was based on the Murdock-Pomponio line
of cases construing statutory willfulness as requiring proof of knowl-
edge of the tax law.'3 5 Claims that certain tax code provisions are un-
constitutional reveal full knowledge of these provisions and a studied
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The Court's reasoning seems flawed here since in tort cases juries routinely decide
whether someone acted reasonably by using an objective standard.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 611-12.
130. Id. at 611.
131. Id. at 611-12.
132. Id. The Court noted, however, that the more unlikely Cheek's beliefs or misunder-
standings, the more likely the jury will not believe them and will determine the beliefs instead to
be mere disagreement with the law. Id. If this occurs, the Government will have carried its burden
of proving knowledge. Id. at 612.
133. Cheek claimed that he sincerely believed that the income tax laws are unconstitutional
in their application to him, and thus, he could not lawfully be required to be aware of any legal
duty to pay taxes. Id. at 612.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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conclusion that they are unenforceable and invalid.136 Thus, claims
based on the unconstitutionality of a tax provision are dissimilar to
those based on a misunderstanding or good faith belief. 137 Since consti-
tutional claims about a tax law reveal knowledge of the law, such be-
liefs are not relevant to the issue of willfulness.1
38
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment.13 9 Scalia agreed that
precedent established that a good faith belief that one does not owe a
tax negates willfulness. 4 However, he disagreed with the test set forth
by the majority of the Court. 41 The majority's test for willfulness ex-
cludes evidence of a defendant's good faith but erroneous belief in the
validity of a tax law, since such a belief necessarily entails full knowl-
edge of the legal duty at issue.142 Scalia argued that if one believes a
statute unconstitutional, then obedience to the statute cannot be a
known legal duty.143 Thus, evidence relating to such beliefs is relevant
to the issue of willfulness.1
44
Scalia was concerned that the Court's crucial test145 was overin-
clusive and would result in the imposition of what he termed a "star-
tling innovation"' 4 6 of criminally punishing a taxpayer for misinter-
preting a complex area of the law.147 Under the majority's formulation
a taxpayer can be guilty of violating a known legal duty if he believes a
regulation interpreting a tax statute is incorrect and relies instead on
the statute itself.14 8 Scalia argued that willfulness cannot possibly refer
to a situation where one knows that a legal text exists but in good faith
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 613. It is important that the Court is interpreting a statute, and in its interpreta-
tion concludes that Congress did not intend to exonerate those who understood its enactments but
regarded them as unconstitutional.
139. Cheek, I1l S. Ct. at 613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. Id. The majority's "crucial test," which prevents a defendant from raising as a defense
to willfulness his belief that the tax laws are unconstitutional, is as follows: "Constitutional claims
disclose complete knowledge of a tax provision and a thoughtful conclusion, no matter how wrong,
that the provision is neither valid or enforceable." Id. at 612-13.
142. Id. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
143. I11 S. Ct. at 614.
144. Id.
145. Comment, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
146. III S. Ct. at 614.
147. Id.
148. Id. Scalia noted that there could be no rational basis for restricting the majority's
formulation so that it only allows for a finding of willfulness when one has the full knowledge of a
statute's mandates, but disallows a finding of willfulness when one violates a duty imposed by a
regulation of which one has full knowledge. Id.
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does not think it binding."' 9
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. 5 0 Black-
mun stated the issue as one of elementary income tax law.'' Blackmun
noted that after seventy years of the federal income tax system, it is
"incomprehensible" that a man of "competent mentality" can assert
with any success the defense that he believed his wages from labor are
not income. 152 The dissent was concerned that the Court's holding over-
stepped the bounds of common sense because it will encourage taxpay-
ers to retain frivolous ideas of the law in hopes of convincing a jury
that these ideas are sincere. 53
The Court's rejection of the Seventh Circuit's objectively reasona-
ble standard for proving willfulness places a heavy burden on the gov-
ernment in criminal tax offense cases. Particularly troubling is the lan-
guage that a jury is "free to consider any admissible evidence from any
source" tending to show that a defendant was aware of his legal
duty."" This language supports the notion that the government is obli-
gated to present direct or circumstantial evidence of the defendant's
subjective state of mind. Assuming this to be a correct interpretation of
Cheek, the United States government will face an almost impossible
task in obtaining convictions for tax crimes.
The burden of proof in criminal cases is on the government to
prove each element of the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'
55
In order to prove a defendant's intentional violation of a known legal
duty, the government now faces the nearly impossible burden of show-
ing, by presentation of affirmative and admissible evidence, the defend-
ant's subjective state of mind, which of course is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant.
Since it appears from Cheek that the government must bring forth
affirmative evidence that the accused taxpayer subjectively knew his
legal duty, 56 the consequence of Cheek is that the government will sel-
dom survive a directed verdict in favor of the defendant taxpayer. In
the past in the Seventh Circuit, the government could present evidence
based on a reasonable taxpayer's knowledge from which the jury could
149. Id.
150. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 615.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 611.
155. See Comment, supra note 96.
156. Cheek, I II S. Ct. at 611.
1991]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
infer that the accused taxpayer knew of a particular duty. This deci-
sion, however, markedly increases the government's burden since the
Court held that the government cannot rely on whether an objectively
reasonable person would have been aware of the legal duty at issue.15
Therefore, it appears that the government will not be able to suggest
simply that a defendant knew his wages were income because all objec-
tively reasonable people know this. Instead, the government must now
establish that a particular defendant knew of the legal duty which he is
charged with violating.
Perhaps the Court acted rashly by dismissing the objectively rea-
sonable standard for proving willfulness. While ridding the accused
taxpayer of the burden of living up to an objectively reasonable tax-
payer standard, the Court stripped the United States Tax Commis-
sioner of his leverage in criminal tax prosecutions by casting upon him
an insurmountable burden of proof. In fairness and as a trade-off for
the benefits this decision bestows on the accused taxpayer, the Commis-
sioner should be allowed to shift the burden of proving no knowledge of
the legal duty at issue to the taxpayer. Without this burden of proof
trade-off, the Commissioner may just as well not prosecute taxpayers
for willful violation of an Internal Revenue Code provision.
To correct the problems undoubtedly created in future cases, the
Supreme Court may back off from the implications of its decision in
Cheek. Alternatively, the United States government may seek relief
from Congress by requesting modification of the willfulness require-
ment in the statutes governing tax crimes.
Janet Hanna
157. Id.
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